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This paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high market
prices. At the core of the argument is the claim that market competition and
bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game, where the pricing
strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies during the
auction.I show that the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent
with the logic of forward induction is the one where …rms bid an amount
(almost) equal to the pro…ts of the cooperative market outcome and follow a
cooperative pricing strategy in the market game resulting in high prices.
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1 Introduction
One of the most debated questions concerning the recent wave of spectrum
auctions held around the world is whether auctions give rise to higher prices
in the market after the auction. Firms tend to stress that they have to
recover the money they spend on obtaining a license and therefore tend to
set higher prices when auction revenues are high. Economists tend to the view
that payments during an auction should be considered as a sunk cost at the
moment …rms compete in the market place. According to the economic point
of view, there is, or should not be, any relation between auction revenues and
market prices (see, e.g., Binmore and Klemperer (2002)). Recent experiments
show, however, that auctioning rights to compete in the market does lead to
higher market prices (see, O¤erman and Potters, 2000).
In this paper I want to develop an economic argument relating auctions
to high market prices. At the core of the argument is the claim that market
competition and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one
game. Pricing strategies in the market subgame can, in principle, depend on
the bidding strategies during the auction. Vice-versa, the particular bidding
behavior in an auction may be such that it signals future actions in the
market game.
To make the argument more precise, I analyze a situation where there
are N bidders in the auction, a subset of which is competing in the market.
The prize that the winners of the auction get is the right to play the market
game. In its most simple form, the market competition game is analyzed as
a coordination game in which …rms can either follow a competitive strategy
resulting in relatively low prices and pro…ts or a cooperative (or tit-for-tat)
strategy with relatively high prices and pro…ts as a result if the players play
the same strategy. As the market competition game is regarded as a simpli-
…ed version of repeated interaction in the market, cooperative play can be
supported as an equilibrium outcome.
More formally, the argument relating auctions to high market prices is
translated in the claim that the only equilibrium in the overall game that is
consistent with the logic of forward induction is the one where …rms bid an
amount (almost) equal to the pro…ts of the cooperative market outcome and
follow a cooperative strategy in the market game resulting in high prices. In
other words, the auction solves the coordination game at the market level in
favor of the high price (and high pro…t) equilibrium. Key steps in the proof
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of the argument are the following. First,1 the strategy ”bid an amount in
the auction game that is larger than the pro…ts one can maximally achieve
by choosing a competitive market strategy and choose a competitive market
strategy” is dominated as it always leads to a negative pro…t. This in turn
implies that if one of the …rms that wins the auction has made a relatively
high bid, the other …rm can safely assume that this …rm will choose to play
cooperatively in the market game. Thus, the second step of the argument
argues that strategies of the form ”bid an amount x in the auction game and
choose a competitive market strategy whenever the other winning …rm has
bid an amount that is larger than the pro…ts one can maximally achieve by
choosing a competitive market strategy” is dominated by a similar strategy
where cooperative play in the market game is recommended. These two steps
together assure that if someone bids relatively high in the auction, …rms
play cooperatively in the market game. The last step in the argument shows
that given this anticipation, competition between a large enough number
of contestants in the auction assures that it is indeed optimal to bid higher
than the pro…ts one can maximally achieve by choosing a competitive market
strategy.
An interesting side issue that comes out of the proof is that during the
bidding stage in the game, …rms may …nd it optimal to introduce a ”jump
bid” (see also Avery, 1998). The size of the jump is given by the di¤erence
between the maximal pro…ts of following a competitive market strategy and
the overall minimum pay-o¤ winners of the auctions could make in the after-
market. The jump is necessary to convince others to follow the cooperative
strategy in the aftermarket.
Intuitively, what the above argument establishes is that by integrating
the auction game and the market game into one larger game, auction ex-
penditures are no longer sunk in the larger game. By looking at the market
game separately, auction expenditures are indeed sunk, but at the auction
stage they are not! Therefore auction expenditures may signal the intention
of cooperative behaviour in the market game.
The more formal argument is related to the ”burning money” argument
in game theory (see, e.g., Van Damme, 1989, Osborne, 1990, Ben-Porath
and Dekel, 1992 and Rubinstein, 1990). The basic idea in this literature is
1Before this step in the proof, a more straightforward point is made, namely that bids
below the minimum pay-o¤ of the market game are iteratively dominated by a slightly
higher bid that is also below the minimum pay-o¤ of the market game.
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that coordination problems like the ones in Battle-of-the-Sexes games can
be resolved if one of two players before playing the game has the option
to burn some money. The forward induction argument that is used in this
literature is quite similar to the one applied in this paper. There are, however,
some major di¤erences. First, in an auction all players, and not just one,
have the possibility of ”burning money”. Second, the competitive pressure
present in auctions makes that in the resulting equilibrium, players do burn
money, whereas the equilibrium that is selected in the burning money/Battle-
of -the-Sexes example, players do not burn money. The fact that nothing
is burnt, leads to a fundamental issue regarding game theoretic modelling
(see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, p. 113): One may always argue that
players have the possibility of burning money, but as nothing is burnt it is
di¢cult to perceive this as a signal as it is not clear whether the other player
considered the possibility of burning money in the …rst place. My argument
is not prone to this objection as the equilibrium that is chosen has players
”burning money”.
As discussed above, the standard economics argument seems to be that
auction fees shoud not a¤ect market prices. While making this point of view
more precise in a section ”popular objections to auctions”, Binmore and
Klemperer (2002, pp. C78)2 also say that
”and it is true that consumer prices can be a¤ected [by auctions, MJ]
(even by past lump-sum payments). For example, paying auction fees could
potentially create ’focal points’ that allow …rms to coordinate tacitly on
charging higher prices. Paying auction fees also makes …rms poorer, so per-
haps more willing to risk collusion, ... And an auction will in principle, select
those …rm that are better able to collude ... But all these e¤ects seem small,
and certainly avoidable with good competition policy.”
This paper argues that there is another way in which auction fees may
a¤ect market prices, namely that the bids signal future decisions concerning
prices. The argument is di¤erent from a focal point argument alluded to
in the quote above as this paper’s model has a unique equilibrium that is
consistent with the forward induction logic. Focal points typically may be
used when there are multiple equilibria. Collusion in the market place of the
form described here may also be di¢cult to detect by competition authorities
as no explicit communication is needed. Moreover, the …rms may argue that
2Other interesting papers by Paul Klemperer on the European UMTS auctions, include
Klemperer (2002a) and Klemperer (2002b).
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the auction has forced them to pay so much that if they don’t cooperate
in the market place, they will go bankrupt. If bankruptcy of crucial …rms
in an economy is a serious concern for competition authorities, there is not
much the authorities can do after the auction has taken place. Of course, the
authorities may threaten ex ante that if they …nd traces of collusive behavior,
they will introduce severe punishments, but one may wonder whether this is
a credible threat given the observation that ex post the authorties may not
…nd it optimal to punish.
The paper is also related to recent literature on the interaction between
auctions and aftermarkets. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996a, 1996b, 2001) study
the way externalities in the aftermarket have an impact on bidding behavior
in the auction. They show that, depending on the speci…c context, standard
properties of auctions do not hold when bidding …rms also interact after the
auction outcome has been established (see also, e.g., Das Varma, 2002). Sig-
nalling does not play a role in these papers. Signalling does play a role in
Goeree (2002). In that paper players have private information that e¤ects
aftermarket competition. He shows that players may have an incentive to
overstate their private information in an attempt to in‡uence the behavior of
competitors in the aftermarket. This paper, therefore, falls in the tradition
of signalling models where actions (in this case, …rms bidding behavior) may
reveal a player’s type. In contrast, I look at a situation where private infor-
mation does not play a role and past actions signal future actions, instead of
a player’s private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 speci…es the model.
Section 3 contains the main proposition and its proof. Section 4 concludes
with a discussion.
2 The Model and Solution Concept
There are N …rms. The game the …rms play is a two-stage game. In the
…rst stage the …rms bid in an auction. The two …rms with the highest bid
continue to the second stage where they play a market competition game. If
there is a tie for the …rst and/or second highest bid, a lottery will determine
the ranking of the bids. The bids of the two players that continue to play
the market competition game are denoted by x1 and x2; respectively, where
x1 ¸ x2. Players only have to pay their bid in case they continue to the second
stage of the game. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, I consider
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a …rst-price sealed-bid auction. For the formal part of the argument it is
conventient to have a discrete strategy space and therefore, I assume …rms can
bid any amount x = ²; 2²; 3²; ::: The grid ² measures the bidding increment
and I assume that ² is small.3 In the second stage, the two winning …rms
play a market competition game. Firms can choose to play competitively
(aggressively), denoted by A, or cooperatively, denoted by C. The 2x2 game
is described in the matrix below
C A
C
A
Ã
a; a c; d
d; c b; b
!
, where a > d ¸ b > c > 0.
So, the value v of winning the auction is uncertain, and can be equal
to a; b; c or d. Note that the restrictions on the pay-o¤ parameters imply
that there are two symmetric pure-strategy equilibria: (C;C) and (A;A),
where the …rst equilibrium Pareto-dominates the second. There are many
ways one can interpret this game. One interpretation is that a static game
(with quantities or other variables as strategic variables) is played that has
multiple equilibria. Another interpretation is that the two players that win
the auction play an in…nitely repeated pricing game which has a collusive
outcome (C;C) and a competitive outcome (A;A). The collusive outcome
can be sustained through the use of trigger strategies.4 In line with this
second interpretation, I denote the action of player i in the market game
by pi: The overall strategy of player i is then denoted by (xi; pi(x1; x2)), i.e.
(and this is important for the argument that follows) the market behavior of
the players in the second stage of the game may depend on the winning bids
in the auction.
It is clear that any type of market behavior can be part of a subgame
perfect equilibrium. Underlying the notion subgame perfection is the view
that deviations from a proposed equilibrium strategy are considered mistakes
which are not informative of future behavior (cf., Selten, 1975). The only
requirement it imposes is that the strategies in the market game form an
equilibrium in the market subgame and in our case there are two equilibria.5
3Note that in most auction designs a bid increment of some kind is implemented.
4For the argument that follows it is not necessary that d ¸ b. The assumption is made
to avoid writing max(b; d) each time. Moreover, in line with the collusion and trigger
strategy interpretation, the assumption d ¸ b is more natural than the reverse.
5Note that in the present context the notion of backward induction formalises the
standard economists’ point of view of ”auction revenues are sunk cost”.
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The argument I made in the Introduction, namely that a deviation of a
proposed equilibrium bid in the auction game should not be interpreted as a
random mistake, but rather as a signal of future actions in the market game
is more in line with the notion of forward induction (see, e.g., Kohlberg and
Mertens, 1986, Van Damme 1989, and others). An equilibrium is consistent
with forward induction if it is not the case that some player, by deviating
at a node along the equilibrium path, can ensure that a proper subgame
is reached where all solutions but one give the player strictly less than the
equilibrium pay-o¤, and where exactly one solution gives the player strictly
more. Underlying the notion of forward induction is the idea that deviations
from a proposed equilibrium should be interpreted as signals of future actions,
if possible. The solution concept underlying the argument above is iterative
elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEDS).
3 Analysis
In this section, I prove the main result of the paper. The result says that
provided the number of competing …rms in the auction is large enough, the
forward induction argument selects only one of the subgame perfect equilib-
ria. The equilibrium that is selected has …rms colluding in the market game.
Moreover, during the auction phase …rms ”burn” all their future pro…ts, i.e.,
their bids are close to the pro…ts obtained in the market game.
Theorem 1 For any N ¸ maxf2(a¡c+2²)(a¡d¡²) ; 4g the unique equilibrium that is
consistent with forward induction has xi 2 [a ¡ 2²; a) and pi(x1; x2) = C;
i = 1; :::; N:
Proof. The proof eliminates sets of strategies in …ve consecutive stages.
First, de…ne K as the largest integer such that (K + 1)² < c:
Step i: Fix an integer k with 0 · k · K ¡ 1: Given that players’ strate-
gies are restricted to xi ¸ k²; any strategy (xi; pi(x1; x2)) with xi = k² is
iteratively dominated by (exi; epi(x1; x2)) with exi = (k + 1)² and epi(x1; x2) =
pi(x1; x2):
The argument here is quite similar to the conventional elimination of
dominated strategies in a …rst-price sealed-bid auction. The pay-o¤s the
two strategies yield in the second stage is the same, because epi(x1; x2) =
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pi(x1; x2); and at least equal to c. Moreover, the overall pay-o¤ of both
strategies is always positive as exi · c¡ ²: The …rms thus try to outbid each
other, which is what drives the bids up. The last step of the this stage of
the elimination procedure is the most stringent and gives a good idea about
the previous steps. So, let us brie‡y consider the argument for the K’th
step. In the K’th step I have to argue that any strategy (xi; pi(x1; x2)) with
xi = (K ¡ 1)² is iteratively dominated by (exi; epi(x1; x2)) with exi = K² andepi(x1; x2) = pi(x1; x2): There are three possible situations to consider: Either
x2 > K²; or x2 = K², or x2 = (K ¡ 1)²: In the …rst case, both classes
of strategies (those with xi = (K ¡ 1)² and those with xi = K²) under
consideration yield a pay-o¤ of 0. In the second case, all strategies with
xi = (K ¡ 1)² yield a pay-o¤ of 0, whereas strategies with xi = K² yield a
positive expected pay-o¤. In the third case, the pay-o¤ of strategies in the
class with xi = (K ¡ 1)² yield a pay-o¤ of at most 2(v¡ (K ¡ 1)²)=N , where
v equals a; b; c or d. The pay-o¤ of strategies in the class with xi = K² yield
a pay-o¤ of v¡K². This latter expression is larger than the …rst expression
for any value of v, if it is larger for v = c. As (K ¡ 1)² < c¡ 2², this is the
case when 4²=N · ², or N ¸ 4:
Step ii: Any strategy (xi; pi(x1; x2)) with xi ¸ d and pi(x1; x2) = A
whenever xi ¸ x2 is weakly dominated by (exi; epi(x1; x2)) with exi < d andepi(x1; x2) = pi(x1; x2):
To prove this claim, I will denote the …rst strategy by s1 and the second
one by s2:When player i sets strategy s1; her pay-o¤ is either 0 or negative. I
will show that by choosing strategy s2, she can never do worse and sometimes
better. There are three possibilities: x2 > xi; exi · x2 · xi; exi > x2:
In the …rst case, both s1 and s2 yield a pay-o¤ of 0. In the second case,
¼i(s1; s¡i) · 0 · ¼i(s2; s¡i). In the third case, ¼i(s1; s¡i) < 0 < ¼i(s2; s¡i):
Thus, s2 weakly dominates s1:
Step iii: Any strategy (xi; pi(x1; x2)) that assigns pi(x1; x2) = A for
some value of x1 ¸ d is weakly dominated by (exi; epi(x1; x2)) with exi = xi andepi(x1; x2) = C whenever x1 ¸ d and otherwise epi(x1; x2) = pi(x1; x2):
To prove this claim, note that at this stage of the argument all strategies
(xi; pi(x1; x2)) with xi ¸ d that survived IEDS have pi(x1; x2) = C because
of step (ii). There are two cases then to consider: xi < x2 and xi = x2.6
In the …rst case, both strategies yield a pay-o¤ of 0. In the second case, let
us denote by m the number of players with a bid equal to xi. There are
6Note that the case xi > x2 is covered by (ii) above as it implies that xi = x1 ¸ d
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two subcases: x1 equals a value larger than or equal to d to which the …rst
strategy assigns pi(x1; x2) = A and all other values of x1 including x1 < d: In
the …rst subcase, the overall pay-o¤ of the …rst strategy is (d¡x)=m, whereas
the pay-o¤ of the second strategy is (a ¡ x)=m. In the second subcase, the
actions prescribed by both strategies are identical and, therefore, the pay-o¤s
are equal.
Steps i ¡ iii together assure that if one player bids an amount larger
than or equal to d in the auction, both players proceeding to the second
stage of the game will choose to play cooperatively. The next step argues
that all strategies that prescribe players to bid less than d in the auction
are iteratively dominated. To this end let us denote by bSC(0) the set of
strategies {(xi; pi(x1; x2))j xi > c ¡ 2² and pi(x1; x2) = C if x1 ¸ dg. Note
that this class leaves the second stage action unspeci…ed whenever x1 <
d. Let us also de…ne eSC(0) as the subset of bSC(0) with the lowest bid
xi; i.e., eSC(0) ´{(xi; pi(x1; x2))j c ¡ 2² < xi < c ¡ ² and pi(x1; x2) = C
if x1 ¸ dg. The lowest bid itself in eSC(0) is denoted by bx(0): Using these
two notions, we can de…ne bSC(1) ´ bSC(0)n eSC(0) and similarly to de…ningeSC(0); one can de…ne eSC(1) as the subset of bSC(1) with the lowest bid xi;
i.e., eSC(1) ´{(xi; pi(x1; x2))j c ¡ ² < xi < c and pi(x1; x2) = C if x1 ¸ dg.
Proceeding iteratively, I de…ne for all k > 1; bSC(k) ´ bSC(k ¡ 1)n eSC(k ¡ 1)
and eSC(k) as the subset of bSC(k) with the lowest bid xi: In each round the
lowest bid itself in eSC(k) is denoted by bx(k): Finally, I de…ne KC as the
number of steps ² that is needed to reach the interval [d ¡ ²; d] from the
interval [c¡ 2²; c¡ ²].
Step iv: Fix a 1 · k · KC and bSC(k): Given that players’ strategies
are restricted to bSC(k); all strategies in eSC(k) are weakly dominated by the
strategy (xi; pi(x1; x2)) with d · xi < d + ² and pi(x1; x2) = C for all pairs
(x1; x2) .
To prove this step, let us call the dominating strategy s4: For each k ¸ 0
there are three situations to consider. Either x2 ¸ d+²; or bx(k) < x2 < d+²,
or bx(k) = x2: In the …rst case, all strategies in eSC(k) as well as strategy s4
itself yield a pay-o¤ of 0. In the second case, all strategies in eSC(k) yield a
pay-o¤ of 0, whereas strategy s4 yields a pay-o¤ larger than a¡ d¡ ² due to
the fact that step (iii) implies that if someone bids an amount higher than
d, players play C. In the third case, the pay-o¤ of strategy s4 is still larger
than a ¡ d ¡ ², whereas the pay-o¤ of choosing a strategy in eSC(k) cannot
be larger than 2(a ¡ c + 2²)=N: When N satis…es the condition mentioned
in the Theorem, the …rst pay-o¤ is not smaller than the second.
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Steps i ¡ iv imply that all strategies with bids xi < d are iteratively
eliminated. The last step of the argument then is again a conventional
auction type of argument. To this end, de…ne Kd as the smallest integer
such that Kd² > d and KA as the largest integer such that (KA + 1)² < a.
Step v: Fix an integer k with Kd · k · KA ¡ 1: Given that players
bidding strategies are restricted to xi ¸ k²; any strategy (xi; pi(x1; x2)) with
xi = k² and pi(x1; x2) = C for all pairs (x1; x2) is iteratively dominated by
(exi; epi(x1; x2)) with xi = (k + 1)² and epi(x1; x2) = pi(x1; x2):
This last step of the argument is, again, just the conventional argument of
elimination of dominated strategies in a …rst price sealed-bid auction. Given
steps (ii)-(iv) …rms always play cooperatively in the market game, which
guarantees a pay-o¤ of a of winning the auction. Firms would like therefore,
to outbid each other, which drives the bids in the auction up. The details of
the argument are similar to the argument made in step (i) and are, therefore,
omitted.
Step (iv) of the proof highlights the use of a ”jump bid”.7 Given the
earlier steps of the proof, a bidder can only guarantee himself the highest
possible continuation pay-o¤ in the aftermarket, if he chooses a bid that
is higher than the maximal pay-o¤ of d one could get by following market
strategy A. Up to that moment in the auction (proof) only bids smaller than
c are eliminated. The size of the jump bid is thus at least equal to d¡ c.
One issue that remains to be discussed is why the argument only works
when the number of …rms is larger than a speci…c lower bound on the number
of …rms participating in the auction. The reason is the following. There is a
possibility that bidding stops at the moment all bidders bid an amount xi
close to c¡ ²: The two …rms that are randomly selected face a coordination
problem in the market game: both playing cooperatively and both playing
aggresively are both Nash equilibria. Even though there is no speci…c reason
to do so, it may thus happen that both …rms coordinate on playing coop-
eratively. The total pay-o¤ for the two …rms of following this strategy is
then smaller than a ¡ c + 2². The chance of being selected is 2=N . Note
that the expected pay-o¤ decreases in N as the chance of being selected in
the lottery decreases. Each …rm then faces the following decision problem:
being satis…ed with this chance of getting a relatively large pay-o¤ or ”jump
7Of course, jump bids taking literally cannot take place in a sealed-bid auction. How-
ever, a similar analysis applies to a multi-unit ascending auction.
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bidding” to a bid larger than d;which guarantees a pay-o¤ of a in the market
game. For ”jump bidding” to be pro…table, N has to be relatively large.
An important question, of course, is to what extent the result of the paper
holds true in more general settings. Di¤erent, interesting, extensions can be
considered: (i) what if more than two licenses are auctioned o¤? (ii) what
if …rms receive di¤erent pay-o¤s at the market stage depending on who wins
the auction? Here, I will brie‡y indicate to what extent the result obtained
here can be generalized.
If instead of two, k > 2 licenses are o¤ered for sale, the result is a¤ected
only in a quantative sense. In order to brie‡y discuss the implications of this
generalization, we …rst need to generalize the market stage pay-o¤s to the
case where k …rms compete. The pay-o¤s when everyone behaves coopera-
tively or aggressively do not need to be modi…ed. When n < k players play
cooperatively and the remaining k ¡ n players play aggressively, one may
denote the pay-o¤ to the aggressors and cooperators by dn and cn; respec-
tively. It is natural to assume that dn < dn+1 and cn < cn+1; i.e., the more
cooperators, the higher the pay-o¤s to both cooperators and aggressors. The
condition for the Theorem to hold changes to N > maxf k(a¡c1¡²)(a¡dn¡1¡²) ; 2kg. The
fact that the condition on N becomes tighter is understood if one realizes
the fact that with more licenses being auctioned, the chance of getting one of
them increases if players bid relatively low amounts. The ”jump” that has to
be made in order to signal future cooperative behaviour remains the same,
however, and therefore, the cost of making such a ”jump bid”. The main
argument, however, remains the same: if someone bids an amount during
the auction that he cannot hope to receive in the market game by playing
aggressively, i.e., if he bids more than dn¡1, then he signals future coopera-
tive behavior. Also, during the auction stage …rms compete away their future
pro…ts, like in the Theorem stated in the previous section.
Another possible extension is to allow for the possibility of having player-
dependent pay-o¤s in the market game: for any v = a; b; c or d; we may write
vi(i; j), which makes clear that the pay-o¤s of cooperating or competing in
the market place may depend on the identity of the pair of winning …rms (i
and j) and on the identity of each of them. New phenomena may arise in
this case such as coordination issues, if, for example, one …rm expects high
pay-o¤s when playing the market game with a particular other …rm, but not
with another. If the di¤erences between the …rms are not too large, however,
(in a sense to be made precise) we may expect the core of the Theorem to
hold true.
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4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown in the context of a simple model how auctions
may lead to high prices in the after-auction market. The main idea is that
by bidding more than the pro…ts a …rm could possibly make by playing a
competitive strategy in the market game, a …rm signals that he will act
cooperatively in the market game. Other …rms pick up this signal and play
cooperatively as well if they take part in the market game. As during the
auction, …rms compete to get a license to operate in the after-auction market,
…rms outbid each other during the auction game. Thus, all …rms bid more
than they possibly could make by competing in the after-auction market.
It is important to note that some conditions are necessary to make the
argument work: (i) there should not be too much uncertainty about future
market pay-o¤s, (ii) equilibrium behavior in the market should be indeter-
mined in the sense that multiple equilibria in the market game exists, (iii)
the winning bids should be publicly observable, and (iv) the number of con-
testants in the auction should be relatively large. I will brie‡y comment on
the …rst three points below; the fourth issue has already been discussed in
Section 3.
Concerning uncertainty, the argument made allows for some form of pay-
o¤ uncertainty as long as the maximum pay-o¤ from competing aggressively
in the market stage is smaller than the minimum pay-o¤ of all …rms colluding
in the market place. In case there is too much uncertainty about future pay-
o¤s, auction fees cannot be interpreted as a signal of future market stage
behaviour. In the case of the European UMTS-auctions, one may argue that
they were held at such an early point in time that the perspective on pro…ts
to be gained was highly uncertain. If this is so, the above argument does not
apply.
When there is a unique equilibrium in the market stage, signalling future
behavior does not make much sense as future behavior is fully determined
by the market constellation itself. Hence, a necessary condition for our ar-
gument to work is the existence of multiple market equilibria. Finally, when
the winning bids are not made public, …rms cannot condition their market
behavior on these winning bids. Accordingly, the …rms cannot use their bids
to signal future intentions in this case.
There are several interesting policy issues concerning auction design that
come out of this paper. A …rst issue is the timing aspect: when is the time
ripe to hold an auction? One may argue that auctions should be held when
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…rms are quite certain about the market potential of the objects (frequencies)
that are auctioned as this will diminish a …rm’s fear of paying too much and
it may boost competition during the auction. This paper argues, however,
that there may be a countervailing argument as well: waiting to reduce
the amount of uncertainty may make it easier for …rms to signal collusive
intentions at the market stage.
A second issue arises with respect to the number of competitors. Standard
auction theory would say that the more competitors, the better the outcome
to be expected from the perspective of the auctioneer. Also, in this case the
paper o¤ers a warning: it may be more pro…table to signal the intention to
collude in the market place when the number of contestants in the auction
is large. So, auction revenues may indeed be high with a large number of
contestants, but welfare generated in the aftermarket may be low.
A third issue arises with respect to the optimal choice of bid increment.
It is easy to see that the lower bound on the number of …rms stated in the
Theorem is increasing in the bid increment ². This means that by choosing
a larger bid increment, the auctioneer (government authorities) may try to
prevent signalling in the sense discussed in this paper.
Finally, it is interesting to observe that by announcing the winning bids,
the government may facilitate collusion in the market place in the sense
discussed in this paper. If only the identity of the winning bidders is revealed,
but not their bids, …rms cannot directly infer what the other …rm has paid
and therefore they cannot condition market behavior on the bids. In this
case, the argument developped in this paper breaks down.
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